Overview of the theory
It is tempting to suppose that some concept of information could serve eventually to unify mind, matter, and meaning in a single theory. (Daniel C Dennett and John Haugeland, Intentionality, in The Oxford Companion to the Mind, Richard L Gregory (ed), 1987, emphasis in the original.)
Not only do I think I’ve found that theory, I go even further. Some people will react: “further even than Dennett? Quelle horreur!” But, unlike Dennett, I try to give equal weight to subjective, objective and intersubjective aspects, and while I do agree with much of what Dennett says, I see him as seriously neglecting some fundamentals. He clings to objectivity, to the detriment of subjective and intersubjective aspects of reality, and I seek to remedy these omissions.
Let’s face it, this looks far too good to be true: the (or a) concept of information can be used to explain not only the relationships between mind, matter and meaning, but also culture, spirituality and psychological health. Of course, information on its own is not actually enough, but it is absolutely central, linking all of these things in a way that sheds new light on each of them.
For sheer ambition, physics does not hold a candle to computer or cognitive… science. Hawking and Weinberg are wrong. It is we, not the physicists, who must develop a theory of everything. (Brian Cantwell Smith, Reply to Dennett, in Hugh Clapin (ed), Philosophy of mental representation, Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 53)
I’m not a computer or cognitive scientist, but, if it’s stretched to encompass philosophy, I think Smith is entirely right there. In physics the phrase “theory of everything” means something quite specific, and “everything” means “everything in physics”, but this information-based philosophy is probably the nearest it’s possible to get to a theory of everything outside of physics.
Actually, it does venture into physics, but only to the extent required to relate matter to other fundamental features of human experience. So maybe it should be called a theory of everything in human experience, or just a theory of human experience. Or a theory of experience. Or whatever, the content is more important than the strapline. Probably.
Let’s look at mind and matter. Valentino Braitenberg wrote:
The concept of information, properly understood, is fully sufficient to do away with popular dualistic schemes invoking spiritual substances distinct from anything in physics. This is Aristotle redivivus, the concept of matter and form united in every object of this world, body and soul, where the latter is nothing but the formal aspect of the former. The very term “information” clearly demonstrates its Aristotelian origin in its linguistic root. (In Luciano Floridi, ed, Philosophy of Computing and Information: Five Questions, 2008, p16)
I think “fully sufficient” takes that into the realm of overstatement, but I agree that information/form is one of the two or three most important elements in understanding what a mind is. Another is intentionality, which Brentano called “the ineliminable mark of the mental”, and which I believe can best be understood through viewing minds as being essentially sets of models.
Meaning is very closely related to mind—it exists only for minds, being, roughly speaking, information in use by, or of potential use to, one or more minds. “Use” is crucial: without purpose there is no meaning—the purpose to which it is to be put is part of the context that determines the meaning of anything.
There are patterns in human behaviour that survive by being copied, and that together constitute culture. Such patterns are called “memes” and the study of them is “memetics”. I aim to develop a concise but convincing account of the relationship between meaning and memes. (At the time of writing this, I’ve written very little about that, but I believe I have all the main elements in place.)
Following a brief period of relative popularity in the late nineties, memetics has declined, and in the eyes of some is discredited. I distinguish between the abstract, philosophical use of these concepts and the study of particular cultural phenomena in memetic terms. I see the former as entirely valid, and the latter as of very questionable utility, that being the main reason for the decline. I share Dennett’s view of human consciousness as being largely made up of memes and their effects (he actually says “entirely”, with which I don’t agree). I also share Susan Blackmore‘s view of meditation as a sort of memetic hygiene. Memes are, of course, items of information, and so spiritual health and psychological well-being are covered by this information-based approach, without, I believe, stretching it too far.
All that has probably put off as many people as it has attracted, but I think it had to be done. Now it’s time to get into a bit more detail…
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