You say “If the feeling of joy can be reduced…” but I’m convinced feelings can never be reduced. Most modern philosophers, including me, would say that if a proposition is untestable, it’s unscientific, and it is impossible to test for consciousness, therefore unscientific to propose that a particular process produces it.

The rest of what you say there, I more-or-less agree with.

you are right, I misunderstood! Thank you for clarifying.

But let me play devil’s advocate and try to see if the p.z. can be thrilled or not, can he feel or not.

What is a thrill and what is a feeling? Do they have to be conscious?
If the feeling of joy can be reduced to a reaction of say endorphin, then we could probably say the zombie feels something.

We are facing a problem while exploring these aspects: human beings are the role model for consciousness and the zombie too. And in reality human beings can be in states of mind that resembles zombies or robots a lot.

There is compulsive thinking, there is reacting according to a conditioning that people are not aware of.

In one word: human beings can be very much unconscious! Almost like zombies… They are not like zombies when they are conscious, as long as they are conscious and only as far as their consciousness reaches.

The last point brings up the question when consciousness is relevant and when it is essential, of core importance…

Obviously consciousness is not required for so many body functions, in fact we would get into trouble having to consciously decide about heartbeats.

Consciousness is of the essence when we interact with other people, when we make decisions.

Best

Hans

I’m afraid you’ve misunderstood my point there.

Yes, the philosophical zombie can, by definition, produce any behaviour a person can, without being conscious. What I’m saying is that Dennett says the zombie can be thrilled, or enjoy, which it cannot, because these are not behaviours, but states of mind. To be thrilled by or enjoy anything absolutely requires consciousness, while to behave as if thrilled or enjoying does not.

The context makes it clear that Dennett means “behaving as if”, but what he actually says is not merely “behaving as if” but actually being thrilled and enjoying. My complaint is not about his philosophy, at this point, but his style of writing.

Thanks very much for taking the trouble to leave a comment. I wish more people would do that, not just say to themselves “that’s mildly interesting” or “that’s just rubbish” and move on.

Where you think Dennett goes wrong: that is the point where you do not get it!
Actually the philosophical zombie could ,if he would possibly exist, produce all these kinds of reactions without having consciousness about them.
The philosophical zombie, as the name suggests, is a philosophical entity and exists the way it exists by definition!
And the definition is that is it exactly like a human being, just he is not conscious like we are.

By the way: the philosophical zombie resembles human beings, when they act unconsciously…
That is to me a underestimated aspect of the idea as I understand it from Chalmers.
This starts by harmless to useful things: that we are mostly unconscious of the traffic while driving are car, because we are chiefly focussed on a conversation - to extremely harmful situations when we make decisions thinking we are led by some conscious aspect, when in reality we are completely driven by something else. When we wake up from that dream, we may even realize, that something has happened that we really would never have wanted!
Dennett goes wrong many times when he pretends to explain consciousness, his main error is undue simplification, but in the example you give, he is correct.

best

Hans Ricke